

U.S. Policy in Pakistan as U.S. Begins to Transition Afghanistan?

by

Colonel David Woods
United States Army



United States Army War College
Class of 2012

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: A

Approved for Public Release
Distribution is Unlimited

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 14-03-2012		2. REPORT TYPE Strategy Research Project		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE U.S. Policy in Pakistan as U.S. Begins to Transition Afghanistan?				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Colonel David Woods				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Colonel Robert Mundell Department of Command, Leadership, and Management				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution: A: Approved for Public release distribution is unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT <p>After more than ten years of war the United States' national security interests in the Pakistan and Afghanistan region remain vital. As we begin the process of transitioning security, governance, and development to the Afghan government we must not allow our internal organizations, agencies, departments, and international partners to become complacent or confused about our intentions in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. As such, the U.S. must relook its policy regarding Pakistan, particularly as security threats in Pakistan remain real and increase in capacity and capability. Central to this effort is the requirement for U.S. policy makers to understand the influence that Pakistan wields in the region and how they will directly influence long term stability in the region and beyond. The salient national objective associated with this strategy is to continue the disruption, dismantling, and defeat of Al-Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and prevent their return to Afghanistan. The question is how do we do that with a fragile and sometimes unpredictable government structure in Pakistan? This paper examines this question and provides recommendations for policy makers to consider pertaining to this dynamic national security challenge.</p>					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Smart Power, Malign Actor, Trust Deficit					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 28	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

U.S. POLICY IN PAKISTAN AS U.S. BEGINS TO TRANSITION AFGHANISTAN?

by

Colonel David Woods
United States Army

Colonel Robert Mundell
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel David Woods

TITLE: U.S. Policy in Pakistan as U.S. Begins to Transition Afghanistan?

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 14 March 2012 WORD COUNT: 5,423 PAGES: 28

KEY TERMS: Smart Power, Malign Actor, Trust Deficit

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

After more than ten years of war the United States' national security interests in the Pakistan and Afghanistan region remain vital. As we begin the process of transitioning security, governance, and development to the Afghan government we must not allow our internal organizations, agencies, departments, and international partners to become complacent or confused about our intentions in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. As such, the U.S. must relook its policy regarding Pakistan, particularly as security threats in Pakistan remain real and increase in capacity and capability. Central to this effort is the requirement for U.S. policy makers to understand the influence that Pakistan wields in the region and how they will directly influence long term stability in the region and beyond. The salient national objective associated with this strategy is to continue the disruption, dismantling, and defeat of Al-Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and prevent their return to Afghanistan. The question is how do we do that with a fragile and sometimes unpredictable government structure in Pakistan? This paper examines this question and provides recommendations for policy makers to consider pertaining to this dynamic national security challenge.

U.S. POLICY IN PAKISTAN AS U.S. BEGINS TO TRANSITION AFGHANISTAN?

...I want the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda

—President Barack Obama¹

President Obama's sentiments as communicated in the above cited quote clearly convey the nation's strategic end state with regard to Al Qaeda.² While there has been a steady degradation in Al-Qaeda, and the ability of other terror groups to effectively conduct operations within Afghanistan and Pakistan, their capacity, capabilities, and credibility remain a persistent threat in the region. The U.S. is constantly reminded of Al Qaeda's ability to project terror and to adjust their targets and tactics to meet objectives based on political and military atmospherics emanating from inside Pakistan.

Security threats in Pakistan remain real and are growing in capacity and capability. Specific threats in Pakistan from Al-Qaeda and other international terrorists are of most concern. Recent examples of this dynamic include, the September 2008 suicide bombing on Marriott Hotel in Islamabad that killed 53 people. Soon after this attack, the government of Pakistan launched a major offensive in the Bajaur tribal area, killing more than 1,000 militants.³ The January 2010 - suicide attack on a volleyball match in the north-west region of the country that killed more than 100 people is yet another example. Finally in January 2011 Al-Qaeda launched a campaign to reform Pakistan's blasphemy law that led to the killing of two prominent supporters, Punjab Governor Salman Taseer in January, and Minorities Minister Shahbaz Bhatti in March. Al-Qaeda continues to plan new attacks on the U.S., Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Europe, Australia, and throughout the Middle East.⁴

Facts and Assumptions

There are some important facts and assumptions that assist in framing the analysis associated with the development of policy and strategy options with regards to Pakistan and the region. These facts and assumptions are based on historical facts and tendencies demonstrated by Pakistan and other state and non-state actors of interests. To begin with, a military takeover in Pakistan is always a very real possibility. The military has a proven track record of stepping in when it feels the country is at risk of becoming a failed state. The military ruled from 1958 to 1971, 1977 to 1988 and from 1999 to 2008, for a total of thirty-three of the sixty four years since the country came into existence.⁵ The average length of a government under political parties or civilian control is 7.5 years. The current government has been in power for about four years now, so based on averages, history and the current political environment within Pakistan the military is due to take over in about four years, and will hold power for eleven years until the political system has a chance to regenerate and become capable of taking over the government and establishing institutions within the country.

Another key assumption is that a stable government in Pakistan will remain a vital U.S. national interest and the nation will remain a source of friction and frustration for U.S. politicians and military leaders. In fact it has become such a source of concern that the U.S. has decided to rely on India in lieu of Pakistan as the anchor of our diplomatic efforts in the region. According to Lawrence Wright's article in the May edition of *The New Yorker*, "India has become the democratic and tolerant country that the United States tried to create in Pakistan with billions of dollars in aid and three serial military alliances."⁶

Finally, Pakistan will muddle along for the next 7-10 years.⁷ As a result, the United States needs to remain engaged with all stakeholders, while taking a firm approach that deters regional non-state actors from taking actions that intervene in Afghanistan's and Pakistan's internal matters. The U.S should continue to provide military assistance and encourage international organizations and institutions to provide additional financial resources.⁸

Pakistan's Medium-Term Future (Five to Seven Years)

Pakistan is in a state of crisis and is quickly becoming one of the international community's greatest concerns. Pakistan is a country with 169 million people and expected to grow between 250 and 335 million by 2050; this will make it the fifth largest country in the world.⁹ Given these numbers in growth, Pakistan's lack of capacity with regards to vital resources such as education, healthcare, and energy sources is a major concern. Likewise the economy is challenged and will not be able to absorb the employment requirements of the growing population. Additionally there is a lack of human capital such as, educators, professional field of doctors, administrators, scientist, and educated women, who currently represent the majority of population growth. For Pakistan to develop it must accommodate such a growth if it is to be viable and robust.¹⁰

There are several dynamics currently taking place in Pakistan that mark the nation as a failing state. To begin with, it has a dramatic increase in violence targeting the critical institutions and key actors that currently hold the country together, such as the police, army, and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Director, various political figures such as Benazir Bhutto and Salmaan Taseer a serving governor.¹¹ It maintains an open policy that actively and openly supports jihads in Afghanistan and India (War by proxy from within its own borders). Pakistan's tolerance or inability to control terrorism

within its borders and those coming in to train and launch international attacks are straining its relationships with China and many other European states even though Pakistan is believed to be cooperating in identifying these groups. There is extensive damage to the country's infrastructure and the population lacks confidence in Pakistani civilian leadership due to the government's poor response during the earthquake of 2005 and the floods of 2010. Finally, Pakistan's economy is on "life support". All of these conditions and dynamics point to a failed state imploding right in front of us.

Some believe that Pakistan will become a failed state within the next ten years if it does not address the major issues and embrace major reforms in the government and military, make drastic improvements to the economy, address social deficits, deal with the challenge of insurgencies within its borders, and embrace the international community.¹²

Others such as Kanti Bajpai believe that Pakistan will just "Muddle Along" for the next ten years remaining just about where it is now.¹³ To support his argument Bajpai argues there are six possible futures for Pakistan, three very radical, and three more moderate. The radical future could mirror a Somalia like scenario where every man is out for himself, or experience a balkanization type situation along regional lines that results in the division of the country into separate states, or an Islamic type revolution movement that similar to what occurred in Iraq and is now unfolding in Syria. On the other hand the three moderate approaches could develop into a deepening of a liberal democracy, a complete military takeover or continuation of what is in place now and is known as "Muddling Along".¹⁴

The first of the three radical futures for Pakistan is the State of Collapse which could occur in the next ten years leading to a situation much like Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal.¹⁵ In this future, there are no central government established institutions and military rule could fill the void to establish rule of law. In addition the nation would experience internal power brokering between warlords and other organizations such as the Haqqani network bidding for power in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. This would result in an endless cycle of violence and exploitation of the weaker tribes and social classes. The greatest risk to the international community would result from warlords along with home grown and international terror groups that would use Pakistan as a launch point to plan and launch attacks against India, Afghanistan, China, Iran and the west. However, given current conditions within the government along with Pakistani military support, this future is unlikely.

The next scenario is Balkanization of the country along regional lines that would result in tribal regions such as the Baluchistan and Sindh and possibly Kyber breaking away under hostile conditions, leaving a significant void from the Punjab's influence that dominates the majority of key diplomatic, military, economical leader positions and holds governmental institutions together.¹⁶ This circumstance would occur if there were a complete breakdown in central authority and power in the region outside of heavily dominated Punjab areas. The risk associated with this scenario would be extremism and terrorism taking hold and exporting violence into neighboring countries and other areas of interest. This is an unlikely scenario provided that the Punjabi dominated Army and civil service continue to hold the power balance.

The third scenario entails an Islamic Revolution (much like Iran) led by Sunni clerics that are able to muster enough unified momentum and gain control of the government and other instruments of national power.¹⁷ If this were to occur it would at least bring about stability. The international community would become very involved considering that Pakistan has a nuclear weapon arsenal. A number of conditions seem to already be in motion that make this a real possibility such as an increasingly Islamized society, Sunni Islam domination throughout the region, and the simple fact that the current government and military have not been able to bring about stability. Currently, this option is unattainable and is not attractive to Pakistanis in general.

The fourth scenario is much more moderate and centers on the establishment of a Liberal Democracy, but not in the strict sense of “liberal” from a western perspective.¹⁸ In this liberal future the nation would look more like current day Turkey where there are elections, an Army that stays in its garrisons, and fairly widespread and moderate Islamic rules and standards of social life. In some respects, an argument can be made that several elements of this scenario are already in place, such as elections and an army that has portions of its force in garrison, along with the various Islamic factions that dominate in regions of the country. Based on public opinion, “Pakistan would find it difficult to accept liberalism for a number of reasons such as the religiosity of Pakistanis, the state of education, weak and corrupt political parties, and anti-Western, anti-American, and anti-Indian feelings.”¹⁹ However, Kanti Bajpai points out the most compelling reason that this future will not occur is due to the lack of a sizable middle class with the political influence and military position to advance the initiative of a liberal democracy.

The fifth scenario is Military Rule.²⁰ There is a very strong possibility the military will return to full power if the political parties do not establish creditability and legitimacy with the population. Even though the Military could assume power when it wants too, there are two factors that are creating hesitancy on the part of the military. The first is that the military currently holds explicit veto power with the government in “critical policy issues regarding the nuclear program, relations with India, Kashmir policy, Afghanistan, regulating the jihad’s and other militants, U.S. and China relations, the defense budget, and military procurement.”²¹ With all this power over the government but without the means to actually manage it; there is no incentive to take over. The second factor is the military is dealing with significant internal challenges with its soldiers and officers defecting, operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and understanding its relationship with the U.S. and other partners that directly impact their funding stream and legitimacy within the international military arena. Finally the burden of taking over during a time of dire economic conditions and social unrest would put them at a marked disadvantage with the international community, their neighbors, and the population. Even though the possibility of a military takeover is very real and feasible it is not likely for at least the next five to seven years.

The final scenario is what Bajpai refers to as Muddling Along.²² This implies that the current state of Pakistan will remain about where it is for the unforeseeable future. A close look into Pakistan reveals that the characteristics described above are alive and well within the region. Thus creating a condition of severe stress and its authorities are under pressure to perform like never before. What is clear is that “no one person, organization, institution, organization, idea, class, region, or outside power is strong

enough to tip Pakistan irrevocably one way or another at this particular time in Pakistan's near term future."²³

A positive turnaround is possible over the long haul. Pakistan will have to make corrective policy changes across the spectrum of its government to ensure the good of the country as opposed to the good of the political party. The changes must be transparent, wide ranging, and consider the entire spectrum of the elements of national power.

The analysis presented thus far paints a very dark picture for Pakistan over the next five to seven years. However, given the importance of Pakistan in the region, coupled with the tenuous security situation in Pakistan it is important that the United States develop a policy that provides the most flexibility considering our new approach to the region. Our policy must put the U.S. and all other international stake holders in a position that enables oversight of funded government programs and security operations until Pakistan demonstrates commitment to defeat terror organizations in the region, and recognize the sovereignty of Afghanistan.

Two Schools of Thought

Unfortunately the United States is not just fighting a war with Al-Qaeda, there is also a struggle on the home front. After ten years of sustained combat in two theaters, more than 1.1 million Soldiers have deployed to combat, impacting not only Soldiers, but their families as well. Additionally, 30,000 Civilians have deployed. Over 6,200 Soldiers have sacrificed their lives leaving over 25,000 surviving family members. More than 46,000 have been wounded, 7,500 of whom require long term care.²⁴ The war in Afghanistan is becoming increasingly unpopular with the American population and is losing political support in the United States and in the international community.²⁵ Further

complicating the situation are numerous accusations and stories of how Pakistan is actually fueling the insurgency in Afghanistan, and negotiating with the Taliban and other terror organizations regarding the impending political atmosphere post U.S. force withdraw scheduled to begin in late 2013.

In light of this dynamic, there are two general schools of thought within the academic and political arenas pertaining to the national security challenge that Pakistan presents. Neither camp is officially documented or published, however each camp has its own cognitive biases that influence the processes pertaining to policy recommendations, options, or other opinions regarding the U.S. position towards Pakistan. During a personal interview with Dr. Steve Biddle, a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; he explained the two different schools. The first thought is what he referred to as a “Benign Pakistan”.²⁶ This idea suggests that Pakistan wants a puppet state government in Afghanistan that will not become an ally to India, and a government structure in place that they can manipulate to the Pakistan’s advantage without any interference from other international stakeholders. Also fueling the benign school of thought is a trust deficit that the Pakistanis feel toward the United States. They don’t have any ill intentions toward the U.S., but there is an undertone of mistrust.

The trust deficit began shortly after the Soviet Invasion in 1979 when the U.S. entered the war to stop Soviet expansion in accordance with our policy at the time. The U.S. entered the war in coordination with the Saudi’s, and Pakistanis, and fought it through the Afghans by providing equipment, training, and advisors. Not long after the Soviet withdraw in 1989 Afghanistan fell into civil war, and the United States and the Afghan elites withdrew from the area leaving behind the collective mess of a destroyed

country, with millions of refugees, well armed warlords, and no government or economic structure. Meanwhile the United States placed significant sanctions on Pakistan for their development of nuclear weapons.²⁷ Nearly 22 years later, Pakistan once again has reason for concern given the recent decision by President Obama to cease combat operations in Afghanistan by 2014, combined with interpreting new U.S. strategy as we clearly highlight India as a key economic anchor in the region and shift global focus.²⁸

The underlying sentiment associated with the benign school of thought, is that Pakistan will once again have to deal with the consequences of U.S. intervention in Afghanistan alone. The mood from the benign camp is that Pakistan is only protecting its long term interest and setting conditions that will allow them to deal with a post U.S. intervention condition in Afghanistan.

The second school of thought centers on the belief that Pakistan is a “malign actor” and is exploiting the U.S. by allowing them to commit resources, and political energy, while simultaneously undermining their efforts in the region.²⁹ The malign school of thought believes that Pakistan is allowing terror networks to operate within their borders and attack U.S. interests in Afghanistan and abroad. Recent examples and dynamics that tangibly underscore this premise include; the government of Pakistan’s tacit support of the Haqanni network; the fact that Osama Bin Laden was living unmolested deep inside Pakistani sovereign territory prior to the U.S. raid that killed him; and the recent bombing at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul on 23 September 2011. The ideology associated with the malign camp is that Pakistan is doing everything they can to undermine the U.S. position and to keep themselves aligned with all of the non-state

actors in the region for their own interest, and to ensure long term regional stability and the eventual control of Afghanistan.

Pakistan will use its own version of its history with the United States to inform its future when considering what options to pursue with the United States. Analysis concludes Pakistan will proceed with skepticism ensuring they retain the initiative to shape the environment, all the while preventing the perception that their government is taking cues on national policy from the United States thus compromising its sovereignty. The assessment is Pakistan will sustain a benign position, and remain a partner with the United States in the global war on terrorism for the foreseeable future.

Existing Strategy and Policy

Current U.S. efforts in the region are guided by the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy that was updated in February of 2010. This strategy was developed by the U.S. State Department in close coordination with the Department of Defense. This strategy is well coordinated and former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates provided a written endorsement to the document. Secretary Gates summarized message simply stated that the efforts in Pakistan could not solely be a military solution. He insisted that the effort must include the integration of all elements of national power. He went on to say, "The recent increase in civilian expertise to work alongside the Afghan and Pakistani governments, and our military forces in support of the people of both countries, have already shown demonstrable gains."³⁰

Similarly, Secretary of State Clinton in promulgating the strategy has made it clear that the U.S. is committed to success in Pakistan and the region long after the combat troops are gone. The strategy lays out the political, economic, and diplomatic efforts within both countries within the framework of understanding the complex

environment and problems that both countries face. The strategy is far from a traditional “Nation Building” framework that we have used in the past, is aligned with our current security objectives and has been developed in close coordination with the Afghan and Pakistani governments.³¹

One of the most significant efforts associated with Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy is the Kerry-Lugar-Berman (KLB) legislation.³² This bill authorized \$7.5 billion in assistance over five years in pursuit of objectives that include; Helping Pakistan to address immediate energy, water, and related economic problems, thereby deepening our partnership with the Pakistani people and decreasing the appeal of extremists. The bill also supports broader economic and democratic reforms that are necessary to put Pakistan on a path towards sustainable job creation and economic growth, which is necessary for long-term Pakistani stability and progress, while helping Pakistan build on its own success against militants to eliminate extremist sanctuaries that threaten the wider region, and the United States.³³

The KLB bill also goes on to address specific security requirements that the U.S. will address by providing assistance to the government of Pakistan to improve the security situation in both the Northwest Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) by addressing challenging task such as Security Assistance that goes beyond Mil-to-Mil and Gov-to-Gov ties by reaching out directly to the Pakistani citizens. Partnered with communications programs that empower Pakistanis to discredit extremist propaganda and increase support for the Pakistani government.³⁴

Research demonstrates The Kerry-Lugar-Berman (KLB) legislation passed in 2009, and the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy of 2010 are complementary documents. The initiatives within the framework of the documents provides both civilian and military leaders with the most flexibility while putting the U.S. and all other regional stake holders in a position that enables oversight of programs and security operations until Pakistan demonstrates an enduring commitment to the defeat of terror organizations in the region, and recognize the sovereignty of Afghanistan.

Impacts of a Changing U.S. Strategy

The Department of Defense (DoD) is in a period of transition.³⁵ During this transition we are most vulnerable to a global perception of weakness, losing focus on our national interest and goals, and potentially abandoning our allies and partners throughout the globe where in fact it could not be further from reality. As we take the first steps toward turning the strategic corner we need to understand how DoD is going to evolve in a post war environment that is fiscally challenged, and that remains full of complex threats from multiple non-state and state actors that are determined to disrupt global economical prosperity while continuing to threaten U.S interest, allies, partners, and the homeland.

Now that Iraq and Afghanistan are on the path toward stability and U.S. interests in the region are reasonably secure, the U.S. has begun the process of responsibly drawing down forces in both countries and focusing on preparing for future challenges. The Secretary of Defense along with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Combatant Commanders have outlined the challenges that will now shape U.S. strategy to ensure the military will have the focus and the tools to

protect U.S. national security interest, rebalance and reform defense initiatives and programs all to support the national security imperative of deficit reduction.³⁶

Within the new strategic priorities there are several areas of concern that may inadvertently widen the trust deficit that currently exists between the U.S. and Pakistan. The most critical is a new focus on a broader range of challenges and opportunities including security and prosperity of the Asia Pacific and the Middle East where U.S. economic and security interest are “inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the India Ocean region and South Asia.”³⁷ The second is even more open for speculation from the Pakistani point of view, as the U.S. has decided to invest in a long-term strategic partnership with India to support its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region.³⁸ These shifts in policy will force Pakistan to reexamine its relationship with the U.S. and India in an effort to determine where they might fit into the larger economic and security picture within the region. In short Pakistan will be looking for indicators of U.S. withdraw of funding and support. Pakistan could come to the conclusion that the U.S. now views them as a strategic and political liability in the region and it is time to move on and allow Pakistan to struggle and force them to seek out new partners with deep pockets and vital interest in the area such as China or Russia.

What the United States must do now is over communicate with Pakistan, Afghanistan, our competitors, and adversaries by ensuring them that our partnership remains intact and that we have no plans to abandon U.S interest in the region. We need to emphasize our commitment to defeating Al-Qaida no matter where they are, by deterring and defeating aggression where it resides and by strengthen partnerships.

Most importantly we must be able to demonstrate that even with a reduced physical presence we can still decisively deliver lethal and non-lethal effects to secure U.S. vital interest.

Convincing Pakistan and others in the region is going to be a great challenge over the next few years, and we must continually engage the leadership and the population of Pakistan or non-state threats will capitalize in our absence. We will be required to maintain those allies and partnerships that we have developed since WWII, but on the other hand we must now reach out into areas where we have indentified new opportunities that support U.S interest. We must meet our obligations to the past and approach the future through a “Smart Power” approach.³⁹

How to Employ Smarter Power⁴⁰

Since 2001, many theorists, national security professionals and academics have suggested that the current U.S. effort in the region is dominated by the military instrument of national power. To date, the Department of Defense has been relied on more than any other element of power, and has provided rapid and visible solutions to very complex problems. Now more than ever it is critical for the U.S. to integrate all the elements of National Power and bring them to bear in a coordinated, synchronized manner to achieve the effects the President has outlined. As a result, applying smart power in an attempt to influence circumstances in Pakistan in favor of U.S. national interests emerges as a more viable option.

Smart Power is neither soft (the ability to attract people to our side without coercion) nor hard (enables countries to wield carrots and sticks to get what they want)...it is the skillful combination of both. Smart Power is dependent on developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve objectives by drawing on both

hard and soft power. It is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels to expand U.S. influence and establish the legitimacy of the American action.

We accomplish smart power by concentrating our efforts in several critical areas that include building stake holder alliances, partnerships, and incentivizing the building of institutions. Smart power also encourages global development through a unified approach, establishes public diplomacy that improves access to international knowledge and economic integration that increases the benefits of trade for all people and finally, bringing it all together through the use of, technology and innovation addressing climate change and energy insecurity.⁴¹

Breaking the paradigm of using traditional power based models will be difficult because of biases that are forged in historical examples and political agendas that create obstacles. There are three main obstacles that hinder the synchronization of national power to enable the employment of soft power. First, is that U.S. Foreign policy as it has tended to over rely on hard power because it's the most direct visible source of American strength. Second, U.S. Foreign policy is still struggling to develop soft power instruments. Third, U.S. Foreign policy institutions are fractured and compartmentalized.

To paraphrase a quote from President Obama's speech that he gave at West Point in December of 2009 as he was providing the way ahead in Afghanistan for the American people he articulated in order to achieve the goals in Afghanistan we need a stronger, smarter and comprehensive strategy. Smart power provides the framework for both civilian and military leaders to develop options with the most flexibility for the U.S. and all other regional stake holders.

Options

In light of the analysis presented thus far in this research effort, there are three possible options for changing current U.S. policy regarding Pakistan. All three of these options have significant consequences for DoD given the President's announcement of the transition of responsibility to the Afghan government starting in 2013.⁴²

Option one take a "hard power" / "malign school of thought" approach with Pakistan by making the issues solely about U.S. interests and distancing the U.S. from NATO perspectives given the announcement of transition and combat troop withdraw in Afghanistan by 2013. This approach must demonstrate a position that reinforces U.S. vital national interest by applying direct and open diplomatic and military pressure on Pakistan by consistently reminding the Pakistanis of the significant economic and human capital investment by the U.S. Government I support of their country. In support of this option it is important for the U.S. to make it clear that all funded and non funded programs and future investments are on the table for review and will be provided based on favorable conditions in the region. This option requires an aggressive, synchronized diplomatic and military approach that is quick in implementing both rewards and consequences for non-support in the region. This theme could be easily attained by emphasizing direct support, and by highlighting India as the new regional economic anchor. Because this approach is radically different from our current engagement strategy we can expect considerable criticism from the international community, coupled with resistance and defiance from Pakistan and other international partners. The risk associated with this option is Pakistan most likely attempting to exert great influence over, or even taking control of Afghanistan by proxy through its relationships with extremist terror groups within the region once the U.S. leaves the region.

Option two takes a “soft power” / “benign school of thought” approach with Pakistan by continuing with current policy and international agreements between stakeholders within the region. The policy must reinforce our vital national interest, but does so by becoming more inclusive and collaborative with our regional partners that share like interest pertaining to the security and economic situation and opportunities within Pakistan. We must continue to communicate intent with regional stakeholders, apply diplomatic pressure and insist on the accountability of resources from an international perspective, while simultaneously not compromising Pakistan’s sovereignty, or infringing on Pakistan’s national security interests by micromanaging Pakistani military or civilian operations.⁴³ The option requires no real change to our engagement strategy and current policy. Although this option is the least intrusive, the principle risk remains linked to the ability of Pakistan’s security apparatus to effectively defeat terror groups that operate from within their border, and to effectively engage Afghanistan after our combat force withdraw.

Option three applies the principle of “smart power” provides the U.S. the most flexibility considering that we do not truly have an indication of how the Pakistanis and NATO will respond once U.S. combat forces have withdrawn from Afghanistan. Our policy must put the U.S. and all other regional stake holders in a position that enables a constant and respectable oversight of programs and security operations that will influence the region. Pakistan must demonstrate an enduring commitment to the defeat of terror organizations in the region, and recognize the sovereignty of Afghanistan in order to keep the U.S. funding stream intact. If the Pakistanis do not become the regional leader that we collectively expect, then international stake holders will be in

position to apply political, economical, and military pressure to ensure compliance. The risk associated with this option is a misinterpretation of U.S. current policy or an event that would lead to an inconsistent stakeholder response.⁴⁴ This would allow terror organizations and other negative influencers in the region to reemerge and gain leverage with a perceived fledgling Pakistan government. Strongly recommend developing option three.

Conclusion

Regardless of the option selected a common theme applicable to all options is that we must assume that Pakistan will muddle along for the next seven to ten years. The United States needs to remain engaged with all stakeholders, while taking a firm approach that deters regional non-state actors from taking actions that intervene in Afghanistan's and Pakistan's internal matters. The U.S should continue to provide military assistance and encourage international organizations and institutions to provide additional financial resources.⁴⁵ No policy is designed to solve all of Pakistan's problems or turn their economic situation around within the near term. But they aim to give the Pakistanis a stake in their country's future and undercut the appeal of insurgency.

Endnotes

¹ President Barrack H. Obama, "Text of Obama's speech to West Point Cadets" December 3, 2009. <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/05/22/national/main6509577.shtml?tag=mncol;lst;1> (Accessed 20 February 2012)

² Hillary Rodham Clinton, *AF/PAK Regional Stabilization Strategy*, (Washington DC: U.S Department of State, Updated February 2010).3.

³ BBC News-South Asia, "Pakistan Profile", January 17, 2012: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12966786>. (Accessed 20 January 2012)

⁴ White Paper of the Interagency Policy Groups report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, Mar 27, 2009: http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf (Accessed 14 March 2012)

⁵ Stephen P. Cohen and Kanti Bajpai , *The Future of Pakistan*, Brookings Institution Press, (Washington DC 2011), 76. A specific quote identifying the know time periods of military coups. The remainder of the paragraph is not original thought, it is derived from my analysis and paraphrasing the author.

⁶ Lawrence Wright, “*The Double Game*”, New Yorker (May 16, 2011): 2.

⁷ Stephen P. Cohen and Kanti Bajpai , *The Future of Pakistan*, Brookings Institution Press, (Washington DC 2011), 70. The paragraph is a deduction and in some cases a direct lift from the chapter. Muddling Along is a catch phrase that Bajpai uses throughout his book to refer to the current state within Pakistan.

⁸ Ahmed Rashid, “Afghanistan”, The Tanner Lectures, Brasenose College, University of Oxford, UK, (December 2, 2010). <http://www.ahmedrashid.com>. (Accessed January 15, 2012). The comments in the paragraph above are excerpts or a line of thinking that is in line with the thoughts and argument of Mr. Rashid.

⁹ Population Resource Center, “*Population Projections: Key facts and Trends*” March 26, 2011 www.prccdc.org/globalpopulation/population-Projections (Accessed 08 February 2012).

¹⁰ United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *Human Development Report, The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development* (November 2010), 186. If taken as a whole from 1947 to 2010 Pakistan’s total population growth rate has been 2.74 percent.

¹¹ BBC News-South Asia, Pakistan Profile, 17 January 2012: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12966786>. (Accessed 20 January 2012)

¹² Stephen P. Cohen and Marvin G. Weinbaum , *The Future of Pakistan*, Brookings Institution Press, (Washington DC 2011): 226-232. Although Weinbaum does not come out and definitively say that Pakistan will fail in ten years, this is what I deduce from his readings.

¹³ Kanti Bajpai is an Indian academic-analyst and the former headmaster of The Doon School, .Muddle Along (Book: The Future of Pakistan by Stephen P.Cohen & Others, 2011).

¹⁴ Stephen P. Cohen and Kanti Bajpai , *The Future of Pakistan*, Brookings Institution Press, (Washington DC 2011),70. The paragraph above is a deduction and in some cases a direct lift from the chapter. Muddling Along is a catch phrase that Bajpai uses throughout his book to refere to the current state within Pakistan.

¹⁵ Ibid., 71-72. This paragraph is not original thought..It is directly in line with the authors’ main points and thoughts.

¹⁶Ibid., 73

¹⁷ Ibid., 74

¹⁸ Ibid., 75-76

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid., 77

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid., 78-79

²³ Ibid., A direct quote... indicating that the tipping of power in Pakistan is not going to sway uncontested.

²⁴ GEN Martin E. Dempsey, U.S. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, *America's Military-A Profession of Arms*, White Paper, February 23, 2012, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id> (Accessed 14 March 2012)

²⁵ Ahmed Rashid, "Afghanistan", the Tanner Lectures, Brasenose College, University of Oxford, UK, December 2, 2010, <http://www.ahmedrashid.com>. (Accessed January 2012)

²⁶ Dr. Stephen D. Biddle, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, interview by author 01 NOV 2011. The interview was pertaining to current policy in the Afghanistan and Pakistan. The discussion leads to several "Schools of Thought" on how some senior military and political leaders view how Pakistan is engaging the United States. It was important to understand how leader's bias was shaped and how they may influence decision makers based on their bias. After the interview I conducted several internet searches could locate no written documentation discussing the theories of the Malign and Benign perceptions that Dr Biddle and I discussed. My references are not exact quotes; these are my interpretation of the dialog between me and Dr. Biddle. I take sole responsibility for the material.

²⁷ Shahid Javed Burki, "The Haqqanis as the pivot in the Deteriorating US-Pak Relations", Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) Lecture Series , Bukit Timah Road, Singapore, 03 October 2011. Information within the preceding paragraph and line of thought is pulled from Mr. Burki lecture. Note about Shahid Javed Burki is Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore. He was former Finance Minister of Pakistan, and former Vice-President of the World Bank.

²⁸ President Barack H. Obama, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense*. (Washington DC: The White House, Jan 3, 2012): 1

²⁹ Dr. Stephen D. Biddle, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, interview by author 01 NOV 2011.

³⁰ Hillary Rodham Clinton, *AF/PAK Regional Stabilization Strategy*, (Washington DC: U.S Department of State, Updated February 2010), ii.

³¹ Hillary Rodham Clinton, *AF/PAK Regional Stabilization Strategy*, (Washington DC: U.S Department of State, Updated February 2010), i. The thoughts in the paragraph are not my

own. They are in some cases a direct quote from the text with a few word smith changes for brevity.

³² 1707 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (15 October 2009), Otherwise known as the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation or (KLB). The core intent of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act is to demonstrate the American people's long-term commitment to the people of Pakistan. The United States values its friendship with the Pakistani people and honors the great sacrifices made by Pakistani security forces in the fight against extremism, and the legislation reflects the goals shared by our two governments. The legislation does not seek in any way to compromise Pakistan's sovereignty, impinge on Pakistan's national security interests, or micromanage any aspect of Pakistani military or civilian operations. There are no conditions on Pakistan attached to the authorization of \$7.5 billion in non-military aid. The only requirements on this funding are financial accountability measures that Congress is imposing on the U.S. executive branch, to ensure that this assistance supports programs that most benefit the Pakistani people.

³³ Hillary Rodham Clinton, *AF/PAK Regional Stabilization Strategy*, (Washington DC: U.S Department of State, Updated February 2010), iii.

³⁴ Hillary Rodham Clinton, *AF/PAK Regional Stabilization Strategy*, (Washington DC: U.S Department of State, Updated February 2010), iv. The thoughts in the paragraph are not my own. They are in some cases a direct quote from the text with a few word smith changes for brevity. The complete text is available within the document.

³⁵ President Barack H. Obama, and Leon E. Panetta, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense*. (Washington DC: The White House, Jan 3, 2012) Page1.

³⁶ Ibid.,2. The details of the SECDEF strategy are found in his cover letter memo dated 05 Jan 2012. The guidance is as follows: "Smaller and leaner, but will be agile, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced. It will have cutting edge capabilities, exploiting our technological, joint, and network advantaged. It will be lead by the highest quality, battle tested professionals. It will have a global presence emphasizing the Asia-Pacific and Middle East while still ensuring our ability to maintain our defense commitments to Europe, and strengthen alliances and partnerships across all regions. It will preserve our ability to conduct the missions we judge most important to protecting core national interest; defeating al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and succeeding in current conflicts; deterring and defeating aggression by adversaries, including those seeking to deny our power projection; countering weapons of mass destruction; effectively operating in cyberspace, space, and across all domains; maintaining a safe effective nuclear deterrent; and protecting the homeland."

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid., 3

⁴⁰ Richard L. Armitage, Joseph S. Nye, "Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) Commission on Smart Power", March 26, 2011, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/071106_csissmart_powerreport.pdf, (Accessed February 14, 2012). The discussion in the CSIS piece for

the purpose of definition within the policy. Most of what you see is direct from the writing. The attempt here is to make leaders think about the policy in a different way.

⁴¹ Ibid., 12

⁴² President Barack H. Obama, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense*. (Washington DC: The White House, Jan 3, 2012) Page 1

⁴³ S. 1707 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (15 October 2009)
“Otherwise known as the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation or (KLB). The core intent of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act is to demonstrate the American people’s long-term commitment to the people of Pakistan. The United States values its friendship with the Pakistani people and honors the great sacrifices made by Pakistani security forces in the fight against extremism, and the legislation reflects the goals shared by our two governments. The legislation does not seek in any way to compromise Pakistan’s sovereignty, impinge on Pakistan’s national security interests, or micromanage any aspect of Pakistani military or civilian operations. There are no conditions on Pakistan attached to the authorization of \$7.5 billion in non-military aid. The only requirements on this funding are financial accountability measures that Congress is imposing on the U.S. executive branch, to ensure that this assistance supports programs that most benefit the Pakistani people.”

⁴⁴ President Barack H. Obama, and Leon E. Panetta, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense*. (Washington DC: The White House, Jan 3, 2012): 1-8

⁴⁵ Ahmed Rashid, “Afghanistan”, the Tanner Lectures, Brasenose College, University of Oxford, UK, December 2, 2010, <http://www.ahmedrashid.com>. (Accessed January 2012.) The comments in the paragraph above are excerpts or a line of thinking that is in line with the thoughts and argument of Mr. Rashid.

